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Abstract
We demonstrate the feasibility of database reconstruction un-
der a cache side-channel attack on SQLite. Specifically, we
present a Flush+Reload attack on SQLite that obtains approx-
imate (or “noisy”) volumes of range queries made to a pri-
vate database. We then present several algorithms that, taken
together, reconstruct nearly the exact database in varied ex-
perimental conditions, given these approximate volumes. Our
reconstruction algorithms employ novel techniques for the
approximate/noisy setting, including a noise-tolerant clique-
finding algorithm, a “Match & Extend” algorithm for extrapo-
lating volumes that are omitted from the clique, and a “Noise
Reduction Step” that makes use of a closest vector problem
(CVP) solver to improve the overall accuracy of the recon-
structed database. The time complexity of our attacks grows
quickly with the size of the range of the queried attribute, but
scales well to large databases. Experimental results show that
we can reconstruct databases of size 100,000 and ranges of
size 12 with error percentage of 0.22% in under 12 hours on
a personal laptop.
1 Introduction
Data processing in the cloud is becoming continually more
pervasive and cloud computing is intrinsic to the business
model of various popular services such as Microsoft’s Office
365, Google’s G suite, Adobe Creative Cloud or financial ser-
vices such as intuit [1]. Besides for cloud usage by industry,
federal agencies are now utilizing cloud services, even for
storage and analytics of sensitive data. For example, Microsoft
recently won a $10 billion government contract from the De-
partment of Defense (DoD) to create a “secure cloud” for the
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Pentagon [3]. While providing important functionality, pro-
cessing of sensitive information in the cloud raises important
security challenges. In the extreme case, one may not trust
the cloud server itself to handle the sensitive data, correspond-
ing to a threat model in which the cloud server is assumed
to be malicious. In this case, data must be encrypted, which
raises the challenging task of computation over encrypted
data. Techniques and tools for computation over encrypted
data have been addressed in a myriad of papers [8, 12, 23, 27]
and various privacy attacks have also been exhibited [21, 25].
A weaker threat model, considered in this work, assumes
that the cloud server may be trusted to handle the sensitive
data (e.g. a privacy agreement has been signed with the cloud
service), but that a spy process is running on the same public
cloud. If a spy process is co-located with the victim on the
same physical machine they will share hardware such as a
cache, which serves as a side-channel: The spy process mon-
itors a specific cache line and measures the time it takes to
access that line. If the victim process accessed the monitored
cache line, the spy’s access time will be short, whereas if the
victim process did not access the cache line, the spy’s access
time will be long. Thus, a timing attack can be launched to de-
termine whether or not the victim process accessed a certain
cache line within a period of time.
Cache side-channel attacks were introduced by [29] who
presented an attack that allowed the extraction of AES keys.
Ristenpart et al. [28] demonstrated the possibility of launching
cache side-channel attacks in the cloud (as opposed to on a
local machine) and they pointed out that such vulnerabilities
leak information about the victim VM. In their paper, the
spy VM must arrange to be co-located with a victim VM
on the same physical machine in the cloud. They showed
how to estimate with high probability where a target VM
resides and then showed how to detect if they are co-located
or not. Subsequent work showed how the cache side-channel
can be used to extract cryptographic keys for ElGamal [34],
AES [20], RSA [33] and recently BLISS [10] (a lattice-based
signature scheme).
Our goal is to explore the effect of side-channels on open-
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source database engines. We present an attack on SQLite,
a C-language library that implements a small and fast SQL
database engine and is among the top ten databases in the
ranking released by db-engines.com. Our threat model as-
sumes that an external user queries a private database stored
on a victim VM, upon which the victim VM processes the
query using SQLite and returns the result to the external user.
The attacker is disallowed from directly querying the database
or observing the outputs of a query. Since the attacker is run-
ning a spy VM co-located with the victim VM in the cloud, it
can monitor the shared cache to obtain side-channel leakage.
The goal of the attacker is to reconstruct the column upon
which the victim is making range queries.
Relationship to attacks on Searchable Encryption. Our
work is inspired by the line of works of Kellaris et al. [21],
Grubbs et al. [15], Lacharité et al. [22] and Grubbs et al. [16].
These works exhibited database reconstruction attacks in sce-
narios where range queries are made to an encrypted database
and the access pattern (i.e. which records are returned) [21,22]
or communication volume (i.e. the number of records re-
turned) [15, 21] is observed by the malicious server. Recall
that in our threat model, an attacker cannot simply observe the
access pattern or communication volume, and must instead
resort to side-channels (such as a shared cache) to learn infor-
mation. Indeed, our attack will utilize the cache side-channel
to learn information about the communication volume of the
range queries. Briefly, this is done by finding a line of code
that is executed once for each record returned in a response
to a range query. Tracking how many times that line of code
is executed by the victim yields the volume of the response.
Since cache side-channels are inherently noisy, we are only
able to measure the approximate or noisy volumes of the
range queries. We emphasize that even adding a small amount
of noise to the volume of each range foils the reconstruction
attacks from prior work. We assessed the effects of noise on
brute force reconstruction (an analogue of the brute force
algorithm suggested by [21] for the dense database setting),
and on the clique-finding approach developed by [15]. As will
be discussed in depth in Section 1.1, we conclude that both
of these approaches fail in the noisy setting.
Our approach. We develop a new algorithmic approach
that reduces our noisy problem to other computational prob-
lems that are well-studied in the literature and for which
highly optimized solvers have been developed. Specifically,
we will leverage both a noise-tolerant clique-finding algo-
rithm (similar to [15], but with some crucial modifications)
as well as a closest vector problem (CVP) solver. In more
detail, we first use the noisy cache data to craft an instance of
the clique-finding problem that is noise-tolerant. Recovered
cliques will then be used to obtain candidate databases that
are “close” to the original database. To extrapolate volumes
that may be entirely missing from the recovered cliques, we
develop a “Match & Extend” algorithm. After the “Match &
Extend” step, we expect to have reconstructed approximate
volumes for all ranges. We then apply a “Noise Reduction
Step” that takes the “close” solution outputted by the previ-
ous step, consisting of approximate volumes for each of the
ranges [i− i], i ∈ N, and uses it to craft an instance of the
CVP problem. Solutions to the CVP problem correspond to
reconstructed databases in which the overall noise is further
reduced.
We note that since our side-channel attack proceeds by
measuring (approximate) range query volumes, it is agnostic
to whether the victim’s database is encrypted. As long as the
spy can monitor a line of code that is executed by the database
engine for each record returned by a range query, our attack is
feasible. Searchable encryption schemes that have this prop-
erty would still be susceptible to this side-channel attack. For
example searchable encryption schemes that can be integrated
with standard database engines, such as order preserving en-
cryption [6, 7] and order revealing encryption [9].
A limitation of our work is that our approach uses solvers
for NP-hard problems as subroutines. The complexity of these
NP-hard problems grows quickly with the size of the range,
and therefore will work well in practice for ranges up to size
15. This is in contrast to the recent work of Grubbs et al. [16],
which showed how to do “approximate reconstruction” in
a way that scales only with the desired accuracy level and
not the range size. However, the work of Grubbs et al. [16]
assumes the adversary gets to perfectly observe the access pat-
tern—i.e. which records are returned for each query—which
provides far more information than simply observing the vol-
umes. It seems difficult to extract information about which
individual records are returned in response to a database query
from a cache side-channel attack.1
We extensively test our attack in various scenarios, using
real databases (with data distribution close to uniform), as
well as synthetic databases with Gaussian data and various
settings of the standard deviation. We also experiment with
uniform queries (each possible range query is made with
equal probability) and non-uniform queries (different range
queries are made with different probabilities). In each setting,
we show that our attack is practical for databases of size up to
100,000 and ranges of size up to 12. We achieve an average
error rate of 0.22% or less in each setting.
Formal setting. We consider a database of size n and an
attribute with range size N for which range queries (i.e. SQL
queries that return all records corresponding to values be-
tween [a,b]) can be made. The goal of our attack is to re-
construct the entire column corresponding to the field with
1 This is because Prime & Probe instead of Flush+Reload must be used
when monitoring the data cache, and due to the fact that a single record from
the database can fill a large portion of the cache, which makes it difficult
to distinguish which records were accessed by observing only the cache.
Additionally, the mapping from the memory location to cache line is not
one to one and hence, a large number of records will map to the same cache
locations, making it difficult to distinguish which records were accessed.
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range size N. Specifically, for each i ∈ [N], we would like
to recover the number of records ni that take value i. The
focus of this work is on “dense” databases–meaning that each
possible value from 1 to N is taken by some records in the
database.2 For simplicity, we assume that ranges are always
from 1−N. However, the result generalizes to any range a−b,
where database records can take on at most N discrete values
within the range. Our attack model assumes that a malicious
party can only launch side-channel attacks to reconstruct the
database. In particular, we assume that the attacker monitors
its read timing from a cache line to deduce useful information
about the victim. As discussed, the noise introduced by the
cache side-channel makes our setting more challenging.3
1.1 Our Contributions
We next summarize the main contributions of this work.
Weaker threat model: Side-channels. Prior work consid-
ers a threat model of a malicious server that is computing on
an encrypted database. We consider an honest server com-
puting on a cleartext (or encrypted) database and a malicious
third-party that is co-located with the honest server in the
cloud, sharing a cache. The malicious third-party can only
learn information by monitoring the shared cache. In partic-
ular, this means that the third-party cannot learn the exact
volumes of range queries and only obtains approximate or
noisy volumes.
Launching the side-channel attack. We adapt the
Flush+Reload technique for obtaining the (approximate) vol-
umes of responses to range queries in SQLite. This allows
us to learn a set of noisy volumes corresponding to the range
queries made by external parties to the database stored by the
victim. The monitoring process starts as soon as an activity
is detected and continues during the duration of the SQLite
query processing. Since the databases we attack are large,
the processing takes an extended amount of time, meaning
that there are many opportunities for noise to be introduced
into a trace. On the other hand, we require accurate mea-
surements for our attack to succeed. We contrast our setting
to other side-channel settings, which typically either require
accurate measurements over a short period, or can tolerate
inaccurate measurements over a longer period. For example,
side-channel attacks on cryptographic schemes require ac-
curate information to reconstruct the high-entropy keys, but
typically take a short period of time, since the keys themselves
2We note that in the searchable encryption setting this is not the typi-
cal case since ciphertexts encrypting values between 1 and N are typically
sampled from a larger space. However, in this work, our main focus is on
cleartext databases and attackers who learn information about them via the
cache side-channel.
3We note that Grubbs et al. [15] mentioned a type of side-channel where
an attacker intercepts the connection between user and server and counts the
TLS packets in order to obtain volumes of range queries, but they did not
consider the difficulties that arise when the measurement channel introduces
noise into the computed volumes.
are short. On the other hand, side-channel attacks for profiling
purposes typically monitor an application for longer periods
of time, but can tolerate noise well since their goal is just to
distinguish between several distinct scenarios.
To achieve high accuracy over a long period of time, we
must handle interrupts as well as false positives and false
negatives. In the case of an interrupt, we must mitigate the
effects of interrupts by detecting and dropping those traces
in which an interrupt does occur. There can also be false
positives as a result of CPU prefetching, which we show how
to detect. False negatives occur if the victim process accesses
the monitored line of code after the spy “Reloads” the line,
and before the spy “Flushes” the line. We do not directly
detect false negatives, but instead show how to deal with them
algorithmically.
Assessing effectiveness of previous algorithms in the
noisy setting. We first analyzed the effectiveness of a brute
force attack, similar to the one suggested in the work of Kel-
laris et al. [21], but adapted to the noisy and dense database
setting. When we ran this version of the brute-force search al-
gorithm, it failed to return a result, even after a day of running.
We expected this to be the case, since the fact that volumes
are noisy means that in each step of the brute force search
there are far more choices that need to be checked.
We next analyzed the effectiveness of an attack based on
clique-finding, as in the work of Grubbs et al. [15]. A graph
is constructed based on the observed volumes of the range
queries and a clique finding algorithm returns a clique of
size N, from which the full database can be recovered. In the
noiseless setting we always expect to get a clique of size N;
however, in the noisy setting there are multiple edges missing
in the constructed graph and so a clique of size N will typi-
cally not exist. For exmaple, when we ran the algorithm on
our noisy data with N = 12, the size of the cliques returned
was at most 3. Further, the clique of size 3 no longer corre-
sponds to the volumes of the “elementary ranges” defined in
Grubbs et al. [15], and therefore is not useful for (even partial)
reconstruction of the database.
Developing algorithms for the noisy setting. Whereas
Grubbs et al. [15] used exact volumes to reduce the database
reconstruction to a clique-finding problem, we begin by re-
ducing the reconstruction problem given noisy volumes to
a Noise-Tolerant Clique Finding Problem by introducing
a notion called a noise budget. To construct the graph from
exact volumes, one first creates nodes with labels correspond-
ing to their volume, i.e. the node with label vi has volume vi.
There is a connection between node vi to v j if there exists a
node vk such that vi = v j + vk. To construct the graph from
noisy volumes, we create a window, w(vk), of acceptable val-
ues around each leaked volume, vk, where the width of the
windows is determined by the noise budget. We place an edge
between node vi and v j if there exists a node vk such that
|vi− v j| ∈ w(vk). The clique finding algorithm will return a
clique that allows one to recover the volumes of the ranges
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[1−1], [1−2], . . . , [1−N] and the full database can then be
recovered from this information. An attacker can determine
a good setting of the noise budget by mounting an attack in
a preprocessing stage on a different, known database under
same or similar conditions. The attacker can then simulate
the side-channel attack on the known database and compare
the approximate/noisy volumes recovered with the correct
volumes and observe by how much they are off, to determine
an appropriate noise budget. In some cases, incorporating the
noise budget into the construction of the graph and running
the clique-finding algorithm already allows us to successfully
reconstruct a fairly accurate database. However, there are
some cases where, even after increasing the noise budget, the
algorithm fails to recover a candidate database (i.e. a clique
of size N does not exist). Further, even in cases where in-
creasing the noise budget allows for reconstruction of some
candidate database, the accuracy of the candidate database
suffers and the run-time increases. We therefore introduce
an additional algorithm called Match & Extend, which al-
lows successful reconstruction of candidate databases with
improved accuracy.
The Match & Extend algorithm starts by obtaining a can-
didate clique from the graph. If the size of the clique is
equal to N (the maximum range) we are done. Otherwise,
the algorithm looks at all the other cliques present in the
graph starting from the largest clique to the smallest one.
For each clique, a potential database is recovered. We then
pick one of the databases as our base solution and compare
it with the other recovered databases. In the Match phase,
the algorithms looks for the “approximate longest common
substring” between two databases. The “approximate” ver-
sion of the longest common substring considers two sub-
strings equal if their corresponding values are within an ac-
ceptable range. The acceptable range is dictated by the noise
budget. Two values a and b are “approximately” equal if
|a−b| ≤min(a,b) ·2 · noise budget. Then for the databases
which have enough overlap with the base solution, the Ex-
tend phase will compare the non-matching parts of the two
solutions and will try to reconcile the volumes in them into
one “combined” database.
Finally, in the Noise Reduction Step, we use the results
of the previous algorithms along with a closest vector prob-
lem (CVP) solver to reconstruct nearly the exact original
database, despite the noisy measurements. The recovered
database of the previous step returns the ranges of the format
[1−1], [2−2], . . . , [N−N]. We can reconstruct potential vol-
umes for each range with these recovered volumes and for
each computed volume we select the closest volume from the
noisy volume set obtained from the side-channel data. We
construct a lattice basis using the known linear dependen-
cies between the volumes of different ranges. The volumes
obtained from the side-channel data correspond to the tar-
get point For the CVP problem. Using the CVP solver, we
find a set of volumes contained in the lattice (so they satisfy
the linear dependencies) that are closest to the target point.
This “self-correction” technique allows us to recover a better
candidate solution for the database.
1.2 Overview of Experimental Results
We ran our attacks in three different experimental settings
including uniform and non-uniform queries on real databases
and synthetic databases which were sampled from Gaussian
(Normal) distributions with varying standard deviations. The
databases all contained 100,000 rows with 135 attributes.
The synthetic database from the Gaussian distribution has
the same number of entries and attributes, but the column on
which the range queries are made is sampled from Gaussians
with standard deviation of 3 and 4, which represent narrow
and wide Gaussians, respectively. The Match & Extend al-
gorithm recovered the database in 100% of the cases within
163 seconds. The average amount of error percentage in the
reconstructed database was 0.09% and the maximum amount
of error percentage was 0.22% on average.
1.3 Related Work
Cache Attacks are a powerful tool that proved to be useful
in extracting secret information from victim programs. In
one of the early works, Osvik et al. [26] presented one of the
first practical attacks against an AES implementation based
on a T-table. They used a Prime & Probe attack by filling a
cache, letting the victim run and then measuring the access
time to each cache set. In another early work, Acıiçmez [5]
showed an attack that targets instruction cache to extract the
information of whether the multiplication function is called or
not. In more recent work, Yarom and Falkner [33] presented
a powerful attack using Flush+Reload on the Level 3 cache
of a modern processor. They tested their attack in two main
scenarios, (a) victim and spy running on two unrelated pro-
cesses in a single operating system and (b) victim and spy
running on separate virtual machines. Another attack of note
by Yarom and Benger [32] on ECDSA leaks the nonce. As a
result of this leakage, the attacker gains access to the private
key and can forge as many signatures as desired. A recent
work by Moghimi et al. [24] showed the vulnerability of AES
encryption in an SGX environment which, prior to this attack,
was broadly believed to be secure. Ge et al. [14] surveyed
recent attacks and classified them according to which shared
hardware device they target. Yan et al. [30] shows the effec-
tiveness of Flush+Reload and Prime & Probe to reduce the
search space of DNN architectures. In a more recent type of
attack Hong et al. [18] shows how to perform Deep Neural
Network fingerprinting by just observing the victim’s cache
behavior. In another work by Hong et al. [19], it is shown how
to use cache attack to construct the main components of the
Neural Network on the cloud.
Database Reconstruction Kellaris et al. [21], motivated by
4
practical implementations of searchable symmetric encryp-
tion or order-preserving encryption, studied the effect of aux-
iliary information on the overall security of the scheme. They
identified two sources of leakage (a) access pattern (b) com-
munication volume. They developed a reconstruction attack in
which the server only needs to know the distribution of range
query. They presented an attack using N4 queries, where N is
the ranges of the value. Lacharité et al. [22] presents various
types of attacks: full reconstruction, approximate reconstruc-
tion as well as a highly effective attack in which adversary
has access to a distribution for the target dataset. Their attacks
are based on the leakage of access pattern as well as leakage
from the rank of an element. Grubbs et al. [15] present an
attack that reconstructs the database given the volumes of
the response of range queries. They showed an attack using a
graph-theoretic approach and specifically clique finding. Each
volume is presented with a node in the graph. They demon-
strated properties that hold in practice for typical databases
and based on these properties they developed an algorithm
which runs in multiple iterations. At each iteration either
some nodes are removed from the graph or added to the graph.
Once there is no more addition and deletion to be performed
they announce that as the candidate database. They showed
that this approach is indeed successful in recovering most of
the columns of their example database. In cases where this
algorithm could not find any possible result they used a clique
algorithm to reconstruct the database, and they showed that
clique could help to reconstruct even more instances.
In another line of work regarding searchable encryption,
Cash et al. [11] presented leakage models for searchable en-
cryption schemes and presented attacks. Specifically using
this leakage they could recover queries as well as the plaintext.
Naveed et al. [25] presented a series of attacks on Property-
preserving Encrypted Databases. Their attack only used the
encrypted column and used publicly known information. They
showed an attack which could recover up to a certain attribute
for up to 80% of users. Grubbs et al. [17] presented an attack
on order-preserving encryption and order-revealing encryp-
tion and showed they can reveal up to 99% of encrypted
values. All these attacks are in the encrypted database setting
in which each value is encrypted whereas the focus of this
work is on databases where the value of each entry is saved in
clear text, and an attacker who may only obtain information
about the database via side-channels.
2 Background
Cache Architecture In order to reduce the access time to
main memory, modern CPUs are equipped with multiple lev-
els of cache. They form a hierarchy such that the Level 1
cache is the fastest and smallest, whereas the Level 3 cache is
the slowest and largest.
The Level 1 cache is divided into two separate caches, one
holds the data and the other holds the instructions. In the
higher level caches data and instructions are held in the same
cache. Level 3 is a shared-memory space and is the Last Level
Cache (LLC). The LLC is all-inclusive of the lower levels of
the architecture, meaning that any data present in L1 and L2
is also present in the LLC.
Each cache comprises multiple sets and each set contains
multiple cache lines. Each line of main memory is mapped to
a unique cache set. Within this set, however, a memory line
can be mapped to any of the cache lines. Typically, each line
of cache holds 64 Bytes of data. Upon writing a line to a set
that is already full, a decision regarding which memory line
to evict must be made. This decision is called a Replacement
Policy and depends on the cache architecture. A popular re-
placement policy is least-recently used (LRU), which replaces
the least recently used entry with the new one.
Flush+Reload Attack Caches are vulnerable to informa-
tion leakage since an adversary who is co-located with the
victim on the same processor, can retrieve useful informa-
tion about a victim’s activities. Specifically, the adversary can
monitor its own access time to the cache and use deviations
in access time to deduce information about whether or not
the victim has accessed a certain memory line or not. The
reason that such an attack is feasible is because the adversary
and victim share the same resource i.e. the cache. Moreover,
in a setting where the adversary and victim share a library,
they will both have access to the physical memory locations
in which the single copy of the library is stored. The attacker
can now explicitly remove a line corresponding to the shared
physical memory from the cache. To exploit the shared physi-
cal memory in a useful way, Yarom and Falkner introduced an
attack called Flush+Reload [33]. The attacker flushes a mon-
itored line from the cache using a special command called
clflush. This command causes the monitored line to be re-
moved from the L1, L2 and L3 caches. As mentioned before,
L3 is inclusive and as a result the removed line will be re-
moved from all the other caches, even if the attacker and the
victim are not on the same physical core. The attacker then
lets the victim continue to run its program. After some time
has elapsed, the attacker regains control and measures mem-
ory access time to determine whether or not the monitored
line is present in the cache. If the monitored line is present
in the cache (reloading runs fast), the attacker deduces that
the same line was accessed by the victim during its run. If
the monitored line is not present in the cache (reloading runs
slow), the attacker deduces that the victim did not access the
line during its run. Hence the attacker knows whether the
victim accessed a specific line or not. In order to perform the
Flush+Reload attack we used the package provided in the
Mastik framework. Mastik [31] is a toolkit with various im-
plementations of published micro-architectural side-channel
attacks. It provides an interface that can be used to set the
monitored lines. For our work we used fr-trace to monitor
various cache lines.
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Cache Prefetching When an instruction or data is needed
from memory, it is fetched and brought into the cache. To
reduce execution time further, Cache Prefetching is imple-
mented to bring a memory line into the cache before it is
needed. The prefetching algorithm decides what and when
to bring data and instruction to the cache. Hence, when the
program needs the data or instruction in the future, it will be
loaded from the cache instead of memory. This is based on
the past access patterns or on the compiler’s knowledge.
Range Queries A range query is an operation on a database
in which records with column values between a certain lower
and higher bound are returned. Assuming there exists a col-
umn c in a database with values between 1 and N. The com-
mand range[a,b] for 1≤ a≤ b≤ N returns all the entries in
the database which has a value in column c in the range [a,b]
(inclusive for both a and b).
Clique Finding Problem The Clique problem is the prob-
lem of finding a clique–a set of fully connected nodes–in
a graph. We utilize the clique finding algorithm in the Net-
workX Package4. The NetworkX package can be used to find
the clique number (size of the largest clique in the graph) as
well as all cliques of different sizes in the graph.
Closest Vector Problem (CVP) Given n-linearly indepen-
dent vectors b1,b2, . . . ,bn ∈ Rm, the lattice generated by
b1,b2, . . .bn is the set of all the integer linear combination
of them i.e. L(b1,b2, . . .bn) = {∑n1 bixi | xi ∈ Z}. The set
{b1,b2, . . .bn} is called the basis of the lattice and is pre-
sented by matrix B in which basis bi is i-th row of the matrix.
In the closest vector problem target vector y is given. The
solution is a lattice point xB which is closest to target vector
y. CVP problem is also known to be NP-complete. We use
fplll [13] for finding the closest vector in lattice.
3 Our Attack
In Section 3.1 we describe how to recover approximate vol-
umes via the cache side-channel. In Section 3.2 we describe
how the clique-finding algorithm was used in the prior work
of Grubbs et al. [15] to recover a database from noiseless
volumes. In Section 3.3 we explain our noise-tolerant clique-
finding algorithm for our setting, where volumes are noisy. In
Section 3.4 we present the details of the Match & Extend algo-
rithm which is used for extrapolating volumes that are omitted
from the clique. Finally in Section 3.5 we describe how to
use closest vector problem (CVP) solvers to further reduce
the noise and improve the overall accuracy of the recovered
databases.
4NetworkX is a Python library for studying graphs and networks.
3.1 Recovering Approximate Volumes
In this section, we explain how to find the lines of code in
the SQLite library to monitor in the Flush+Reload attack and
how to reduce the noise in our measurements. We will then
explain how to recover the approximate volumes.
Victim’s Query The victim issues a range query to SQLite
database. SQLite returns the relevant entries as it processes
the query. These entries are simply saved in a linked list and
once SQLite is finished with processing the query , the linked
list is returned to the victim.
Detecting Lines to Monitor SQLite stores columns using
the BTree data structure. We examined the SQLite program,
and by using the gcov command we detected lines that are
called once in each iteration of a range query, and monitor-
ing the number of times these lines are called will allow us
to determine the volume of a query response. To obtain the
number of times each line is executed we compiled our li-
brary using -fprofile-arcs and -ftest-coverage flags.
We run the range query command and by using the gcov com-
mand we count the number of times each line is executed in
files sqlite3.c and main.c, respectively.
We looked for more lines throughout the SQLite program
and we chose to simultaneously monitor two lines to increase
the measurement accuracy. Monitoring two lines has the ben-
efit that in case the attack code fails to detect an activity in
one of the lines due to overlap between attacker reload and
victim access there is still a high probability of seeing activ-
ity in the second line. There might be some excessive false
positives due to the mismatch of hits for both of the lines and
we mitigate for that by considering close hits to be from the
same activity.
Using the Mastik Toolkit. Once we detect the lines that
leak the volume of the queries, we use the Mastik Toolkit to
monitor those lines while SQLite is processing a range query.
Figure 1 shows one sample measurement. Two moni-
tored lines are represented by blue and orange color. Mastik-
FR-trace will automatically start measuring once it detects
a hit in either of the monitored lines in the SQLite program.
Once there is no more activity detected by Mastik for a while
(as set in the IDLE flag), it will automatically end the measure-
ment. During the interval where range query execution occurs,
there are samples with reload time less than 100 cycles. Those
are the samples points in which SQLite accessed the line the
attacker is monitoring and hence a small reload time is seen
by the attacker. We then count the number of times there is
a hit in either a blue or orange measurement. The hit count
corresponds to the volume of the query.
Noise in the traces The number of hits that we count might
be different than the actual value of the volume since measure-
ments are not noiseless. Here we explain some of the sources
of noise.
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Figure 1: The result of running Flush+Reload attack on
SQLite. There are two lines being monitored by attacker.
The x-axis shows the sample point in which reload occurs
and y-axis depicts the amount of time needed to reload the
monitored line from memory at that time instance. Since two
lines are being monitored, we have two sets of measurement
at each time instance.
• False Positive: Recall that speculative execution of an
instruction causes the memory line to be brought into the
cache before it is executed. In terms of the Flush+Reload
attack, it will still look like this instruction was executed,
since there will be a fast access time. Generally the true
hits happen at fixed time interval. If we see a hit which
happens much sooner than the expected time for a hit it
is most likely a false positive and we assume it occurred
due to speculative execution and we do not count it as a
hit.
• False Negative: These occur if the victim process ac-
cesses the monitored line of code after the spy “Reloads”
the line, and before the spy “Flushes” the line. We do
not attempt to detect false negatives experimentally, but
rather deal with them algorithmically: As will be dis-
cussed in Section 3.3, we use an asymmetric window
around each observed volume to compensate for the
fact that true volumes are typically greater than the ob-
served volume. In our experiments we allocate 90% of
the window width to the values greater than the observed
volume.
Running the experiment We randomly select and exe-
cute range query [a,b] while monitoring lines using Mastik-
FR-trace. We repeat this experiment a number of times in
order to gather enough traces. For each trace we count the
number of times that either of the lines shows a hit and after
mitigating the False Positive issue, we report the number of
hits as the volume of the ranges query for that trace.
Figure 2 shows the result of aggregating the volumes re-
ported by the traces. Some volumes are observed far more
frequently than others, and those values are saved as an ap-
proximation to the expected volumes. In a noiseless setting
we expect to see at most
(N
2
)
+N values (there might be some
volumes which correspond to more than one range query).
In the noisy setting, there are cases where the trace is “good
enough” but the volume is not correct. By aggregating all the
traces the effect of those instances will be insignificant and
the approximation of correct volumes will stand out. However,
the volumes we recover are not exactly the correct volumes
from the database.
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Figure 2: Sample noisy volumes recovered by cache attack.
The x-axis is the volume and y-axis shows the number of
occurrence of that volume. For a sample database, we ran
the range query multiple times and for each range query we
monitored the cache activity to recover the volume of the
range for that query. We repeated this process multiple times
and counted how many times a volume occurred.
Figure 3 shows a closer snapshot of Figure 2 for volumes
in the range 7000−9000. The red dotted bars represent the
actual volume of the range query response, while the blue
line shows the approximate volumes recovered by the cache
attack. For every correct volume (red line), there is a blue line
with some high value close to it.
3.2 Clique Finding–Noiseless Volumes
To construct the graph we first explain the clique finding
algorithm of Grubbs et. al. [15] and then extend their tech-
nique to cover the noisy case. There are two main parts to the
Algorithm.
• Creating Nodes Given the recovered volumes set V we
create a node for representing each volume and label the
node with its corresponding volume, meaning the node
vi has volume vi.
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Figure 3: A closer look at the recovered volumes. The blue
figure is the actual measurement from processing traces from
the cache attack. The red bar is the actual volume expected to
be observed. It can be seen that the recovered volumes (blue)
is approximate version of actual volumes (red).
• Creating Edges There is an undirected edge between
two nodes vi,v j ∈V if there exists another node vk ∈V
such that vi = v j + vk.
By running the clique finding algorithm on the constructed
graph, one can recover the volumes. Assuming the range of
values are from 1 to N there are
(N
2
)
+N = N(N+1)2 possible
ranges, and therefore N(N+1)2 nodes in the graph. Each range
[i− j] for 1≤ i≤ j ≤ N is represented by a node. The nodes
that correspond to ranges of the format [1− i] for 1≤ i≤ N
form a clique, since for each pair of ranges of the form [1− i]
and [1− j] for 1≤ i< j≤N there is another range of the form
[(i+1)− j] for 1≤ i < j ≤ N, which implies, due to how the
graph is constructed, that there is an edge between [1− i] and
[1− j]. The clique finding algorithm finds the nodes [1− i]
for 1≤ i≤ N. To recover the original ranges which are of the
form [i− i] for 1≤ i≤N, all that is needed is to sort the nodes
based on their labels, which corresponds to their volumes, and
subtract them sequentially since [i− i] = [1− i]− [1− (i−1)]
for 1 < i≤ N.
3.3 Clique Finding–Noisy Volumes
In the noisy case considered here, all recovered volumes are
close to the correct volumes, but the exact volumes may not
have been recovered. Hence, the procedure for noiseless case
fails to find the cliques of large enough size. This is because
the condition to connect nodes vi,v j will almost always fail
(even when there should be an edge) since there will not be a
third volume vk such that the equation vi = v j + vk is exactly
satisfied. This means that the constructed graph is missing too
many edges and the large cliques are not formed. To mitigate
the effect of the noise, we modify the second step of the graph
generation algorithm i.e. Creating Edges.
While the recovered volumes are close to the correct ones,
as explained in Section 3.1, since the traces are noisy we do
not expect to get the exact volumes and we often under-count.
We call the ratio of the recovered volume to the correct vol-
ume the “noise ratio.” In the first step the attacker performs
a preprocessing step which involves mounting the attack on
a database known to the attacker. The attacker then assesses
the quality of the traces to find the approximate values of
the “noise ratio”. To find it the attacker heuristically looks
at the recovered volumes and compares them to the correct
volumes they are expecting to compute. Then based on all
the noise ratios, the attacker sets a value for “noise budget”
which is the mean of the “noise ratio” he observed. Once the
noise budget is fixed, for each recovered volume the attacker
creates a window of acceptable values around it. Assume
the recovered volume is vi, the attacker creates an asymmet-
ric window around vi with lower bound and upper bound of
vi×(1−0.1 ·noise budget) and vi×(1+0.9 ·noise budget),
respectively. As it was also mentioned in Section 3.1, the win-
dow is asymmetric with 90% of its width on the right hand
side of it, as the noisy volumes are typically less than the
true volumes due to false positives. For a volume vi we de-
note by w(vi) the window around it. To construct the graph
in the noisy case we modify the second step of the algorithm
explained in Section 3.2 as follows:
• (Modified) Creating Edges There is an undirected edge
between two nodes vi ∈ V and v j ∈ V if there exists
another node vk ∈V such that |vi− v j| ∈ w(vk).
In particular, we will say that candidate volumes u and v
are “approximately equal” if |u−v|min(u,v) ≤ noise budget. As we
will show in Section 4 using the above algorithm, with the
just-mentioned modification, is in some cases sufficient to
approximately reconstruct the database.
3.4 Match & Extend
In this section we describe an improvement on the noisy
clique-finding algorithm that is used in cases where the noisy
clique-finding algorithm fails to find a maximal clique of size
N, even with appropriate adjustment of the noise budget.
First, recall that the idea behind the clique finding
algorithm is that if we have the volumes of all ranges
present in our data, then there must exist a clique in the
graph corresponding to the volumes of the ranges [1− i]
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N. Now, let us assume there is a missing
(approximate) volume corresponding to range [i− j]. This
will result in the missing connection from the node [1− j]
to node [1− (i− 1)] as the reason that there had to be a
connection was because [1− j] ≈ [1− (i− 1)]+ [i− j]. As
a result of this missing volume, the maximal clique of size
N will not form. If we run the clique finding algorithm on
the data with the missing volume, it will return a clique of
size smaller than N. Our algorithm finds several of these
cliques of smaller size and for each of them recovers a
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candidate database. Then the algorithm merges these smaller
databases to form larger ones. In the following we explain
the idea of the algorithm given an example. Given a database
with 5 possible values in the range, i.e. N = 5, assume the
database is [30,100,80,30,60] (i.e. the database contains 30
records with value 1, 100 records with value 2, etc.). The set
of possible values for the volume of a range query is V =
{30,60,80,90,100,110,130,170,180,210,240,270,300}.
The graph constructed from the these volumes is shown
in Figure 4. The maximal clique found by the clique
finder algorithm is shown by bold connections in Fig-
ure 4-a. The returned nodes are {30,130,210,240,300}
and the reconstructed database is [30,100,80,30,60].
Assume the recovered volumes are noisy and the set of
possible values for the volume of a range query is V =
{29,58,79,89,98,108,128,160,178,209,239,268,299}. In
Figure 4-b all the noisy volumes are rather close to their
actual values except the volume 160 which is far from the
correct one, i.e. 170. To construct the graph in this setting
we use the algorithm mentioned in Section 3.3 and just
for the sake of the example we take the window around
volume vi to have lower and upper bound of vi−1 and vi+3,
respectively. There will be some connections missing as
a result of this error in the measurement. For example the
connection from node 299 to node 128 is not going to be
formed since there is no longer a window which contains
171. If we run the clique finding algorithm on the new
graph the result is going to be a clique of size smaller than
N = 5. As seen in Figure 4-c, a clique finding algorithm
returns the clique of size 4 with values {29,128,209,239}
that results in database [29,99,81,30]. Figure 4-d shows
another clique of size 4 with values {29,209,239,299} that
results in database [29,180,30,60]. In this case it can be
observed two databases approximately “match” in some
locations, i.e. [29,180(99+ 81),30]. It is important to note
that although in this example 180 is exactly equal to 99+81,
this need not hold in general, thus we consider two sequences
a match if their values are approximately equal. We can
deduce that value 60 also belongs to the database and we can
“extend” the initial candidate to include 60 and return the
database [29,99,81,30,60]. In another scenario assume we
first detect the database of Figure 4-d and then we discover
the database in Figure 4-c. In that case we can see that
we can rewrite the initial candidate, i.e. [29,180,30,60] as
[29,180 = (99+81),30,60] using the second candidate.
We next describe in detail the main steps taken in the Match
& Extend algorithm in the case that the volumes are approxi-
mate/noisy and the noisy clique finding algorithm fails to find
a clique of size N. The high level steps of the Match & Extend
can be found in Algorithm 1. We note that, in some cases,
simply increasing the noise budget allows us to successfully
find a clique of size N. However, as we will discuss in Sec-
tion 4, by not increasing the noise budget and instead running
the Match & Extend algorithm, we can recover a database
that is closer to the true database.
Algorithm 1: Match & Extend Algorithm
Result: A database with N values
baseSolution = FindMaximalClique();
allCliques = FindRemainingCliques(K, `);
while length(baseSolution) < N do
candidateSolution= FindBestCandidate(allCliques);
baseSolution= Merge(baseSolution, candidateSolution)
end
return baseSolution
FindMaximalClique The first step in the Match & Extend
algorithm is to find a maximal clique in the constructed graph.
Let K denote the size of a maximal clique recovered in this
step. Once the clique is found, the corresponding database
is found as a result of that. If there is more than one clique
with the same maximal size select one of them arbitrarily. We
call this database baseSolution and the rest of the algorithm
will expand this database. If the size of maximal clique found
in this step is N we are done, otherwise the Match & Extend
algorithm expands the baseSolution.
FindRemainingCliques Recover all cliques of size
K−1,K−2, . . . ,K− ` and sort them from the largest clique
size to the smallest. For each clique the corresponding
database is found and is called candidateSolution. The
candidateSolution is in the form of an ordered list of volumes
that correspond to neighbouring ranges of the database. Note
that the cliques to be found in this step are not restricted
to be from the ranges in the form [1− 1], [1− 2], ..., [1−K]
for some K. In fact, and this holds in the noiseless setting
too, any set of volumes corresponding to ranges of the form
[i− i1], [i− i2], . . . , [i− ik] where i ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < ik will
form a clique of size k, provided that all the differences of
the volumes corresponding to these ranges are present in
our data. This fact will enable our algorithm to discover the
volumes of different parts of the true database and “merge”
those parts to recover the original database.
ApproximateLCSubstring This is a subroutine that is in-
voked as a part of Merge function. Given a baseSolution and
a candidateSolution in form of lists of volumes of neighboring
ranges, find the longest common substring of these solutions,
i.e. the longest contiguous list of volumes where both so-
lutions agree. We call this substring the commonSub-Solution.
To find it, we use a standard longest common substring al-
gorithm with a modification that the elements of the sub-
string need to be only approximately equal (as it is defined
in Section 3.3) to the corresponding elements of baseSolution
and candidateSolution. At termination this will return the
commonSub-Solution and the starting and ending indices of
commonSub-Solution in the two given solutions.
Merge Given the baseSolution and a candidateSolution in
the form of lists of volumes, attempt to combine the in-
formation in them into one larger solution. We refer to
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(c) A maximal Cliquein a graph with approxi-mate/noisy volumes.
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(d) Another maximal Cliquein a graph with approxi-mate/noisy volumes.Figure 4: The graph constructed from the exact volumes has a maximal clique which can be used to recover the original database,while the noisy volumes might have smaller maximal cliques and the original database can not be recovered from just one clique.this as “merging” the two solutions. The Merge functionfirst invokes ApproximateLCSubstring to find the approx-imate longest common substring of the two solutions. Af-ter the longest common substring of the two solutions andthe locations of this substring in the two solutions arefound, there can still be volumes where the baseSolution andcandidateSolution agree, which are not recognized by the Ap-proximateLCSubstring. For example, if the baseSolution is[29,99,81,30] and candidateSolution is [29,180,30,60], thecommonSub-Solution may be found as [29], however one cansee that the two solutions agree at [99, 81] as well, onlyin the candidateSolution this information appears as the vol-ume of one range [180] which is the union of those twoneighboring ranges in baseSolution. The merging algorithmidentifies such cases and extends the commonSub-Solution ac-cordingly. The algorithm searches for occurrences where avolume vi next to the end of the commonSub-Solution in oneof the solutions (say in baseSolution) is approximately equalto the sum of volumes u j,u j+1, . . . ,u j+r for r ≥ 0 next tothe same end of the commonSub-Solution in the other solu-tion (say candidateSolution). In such a case, it extends thecommonSub-Solution by appending to it [u j,u j+1, . . . ,u j+r], andchanging endpoints of the commonSub-Solution in baseSolutionand candidateSolution. So in the database given above, thealgorithm will look at the neighbors of [29] and discoverthat 180 ≈ 99 + 81, and extend the commonSub-Solution to[29,99,81]. Then, the algorithm will look at the neigh-bors of [29,99,81] and discover that 30≈ 30, extending thecommonSolution further to [29,99,81,30]. It is important tomention that while the values in the example were exactlyequal, the algorithm accepts values which are approximatelyequal as well, meaning that we look for whether 180 ?≈ 99+81or whether 30 ?≈ 30. After the commonSub-Solutionis maximallyextended, our two solutions will have the following form:
baseSolution = [pref1,comm,suff1] and candidateSolution =[pref2,comm,suff2], where comm is the commonSub-Solutionfound as previously explained, and any of the prefixes andsuffixes may be empty. The algorithm then will do one offour things: (a) if pref1 (similarly, suff1) is empty, it willextend the commonSub-Solution to comm = pref2||comm (sim-ilarly, comm ||suff2), (b) if pref2 (similarly, suff2) is empty,it will extend the commonSub-Solution to comm = pref1||comm(similarly, comm ||suff1), (c) if both pref1 and pref2 (similarly,suff1 and suff2) are of length 1, meaning they both containone volume (say, a and b, with a < b), and if the absolutevalue of the difference of these volumes appears in our vol-ume measurements, then comm = [(b−a),a]||comm (similarlycomm = comm ||[a,(b− a)]), (d) if none of the above condi-tions are satisfied, the algorithm will abort the merge andrepeat its steps for another candidateSolution. The condition(c) above is for identifying the cases where the volume in, say,suff1 corresponds to a range [i− j], which includes in itselfthe range of the volume in suff2, which can be [i−k] for k< j.If the difference of these two volumes appears in the mea-sured volumes, that difference likely corresponds to the range[(k+1)− j], so we replace [b] ([i− j]) by [a,(b−a)] (whichis the range[i− k] and range [(k+1)− j], respectively).Back to our example database of [30,100,80,30,60], wehad last found the commonSub-Solution to be [29, 99, 81, 30]. Inthe merge step, we are going to have baseSolution = [comm]and candidateSolution= [comm,60]. This falls under the case(a) where suff1 is empty, so the algorithm appends suff2= [60] to the commonSub-Solution and returns the solution asbaseSolution= [29, 99, 81, 30, 60].FindBestCandidate Any time a merge is successful, twosolutions are combined into one to create a larger solution.The reason why this larger solution was not initially found bythe clique finder is that some volumes or connections in the10
graph were missing, and so a potential clique corresponding
to this solution could not be formed. Thus, every merge of
two solutions identifies the number of missing volumes that
prevented the combined solution to be found in the first place;
in fact, if we were to add those missing volumes to the graph
and start the algorithm again, the combined “merged” solution
would show up among all listed solutions. Therefore we use
the number of missing volumes as a metric for assessing the
goodness of a candidate solution; if there are few missing vol-
umes, it suggests that the baseSolution and candidateSolution
agree in many volumes of the database, and are thus com-
patible, whereas if there are many missing volumes, the two
solutions likely have different information about the volumes.
The FindBestCandidate finds the candidate solution among
all cliques that has the least number of such missing volumes
with respect to being merged with the baseSolution.
3.5 Error Reduction Step
As explained in the previous section by using the noisy clique-
finding and Match & Extend algorithms on the noisy data
we get some close answer to the real database. Here we
outline a technique which can reduce the noise and output
a more accurate answer. The first step is to compute all
the
(N
2
)
+N volumes corresponding to each range. Specif-
ically, the ranges [1−1], [1−2], . . . , [1−N] are obtained us-
ing noisy clique-finding or Match & Extend. Each range
[i− j] can be computed from the elementary volumes as
[i− j] = [1− j]− [1−(i−1)]. Instead of taking the computed
value for range [i− j], we choose the value in the set of vol-
umes (obtained from the side-channel data) that is closest to
this computed value. This procedure results in N′ =
(N
2
)
+N
volumes which we call candidate volumes. Now note that
given the volumes of the ranges [1−1], [2−2], . . . , [N−N],
the volume of any other range [i− j] can be expressed as
a linear combination of these values. Therefore, our vari-
able ~x = (x1, . . . ,xN) corresponds to the volumes of the
ranges [1−1], [2−2], . . . , [N−N] and our candidate volumes
~v = (v1, . . . ,vN′), correspond to noisy linear combinations
of the xi’s. Thus, solving for the ~x which yields the closest
solution to~v = (v1, . . . ,vN′) under the linear constraints, cor-
responds to solving a Closest Vector Problem (CVP).
For example, if the range has size N = 3, then we obtain
a total of 6 volumes v1, . . . ,v6 corresponding to the ranges
[1−1], [2−2], [3−3], [1−2], [2−3], [1−3] and can construct
the following system of equations:
A~x+~e =~v
where
A =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 1 1

~v= (v1, . . . ,v6),~e is the amount of error and~x is unknown. To
solve this problem, we can consider the lattice defined by A~z,
where A is the basis and~z is any integer vector. Now, given
~v, we would like to find the closest lattice vector~y = A~x′ to~v.
Once we have~y, we can solve to get ~x′.
To create a full rank matrix for our solver, we can modify
matrix A as following:
A′ =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 T 0 0
0 1 1 0 T 0
1 1 1 0 0 T

where T  n and~v stays the same.
Now we obtain a solution of dimension 6 (as opposed to
dimension 3), but the last three coordinates should always be
0, since if they are non-zero there will be at least ± T in the
corresponding coordinate of~v , which will clearly not be the
closest vector.
4 Experimental Results
We performed three sets of experiments denoted by I, II, III. In
the first two sets of experiments (I and II) we constructed 10
databases from the NIS2008 database, by randomly selecting
100,000 records. Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) is part
of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) which
is being used to analyze national trends in healthcare [4].
The NIS is gathered yearly and each year has information
on approximately 5 million to 8 million inpatient stays. We
selected NIS from the year 2008; the full description of each
attribute of the database is reported in [4]-Table 1. In the
first set of experiments (Experiment I) we performed uniform
range queries on the AMONTH attribute which corresponds
to admission month coded from (1) January to (12) Decem-
ber (i.e., each of the possible ranges were queried with equal
probability). In the second set of experiments (Experiment II)
we used the same databases as in Experiment I, but performed
non-uniform range queries. Specifically, in these experiments
we either queried the first half of the possible ranges twice
as often as the second half or vice versa. In the third set of
experiments (Experiment III) we sampled the database as fol-
lows: Instead of using the real data for the AMONTH column,
we generated synthetic data by sampling the values from a
Gaussian (Normal) distribution with mean 1+N2 and standard
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deviation of 3 and 4, respectively. So within Experiment III,
we considered two data distributions, a “narrow” Gaussian
with standard deviation 3 and a “wide” Gaussian with stan-
dard deviation 4.
We ran the experiments on a Lenovo W540 Laptop with In-
tel Core i7-4600M CPU clocking at 2.9 GHz running Ubuntu
16.04. The L1, L2 and L3 caches have capacities 32KB,
256KB and 4MB, respectively. We heuristically observed
that if we gather around 100 measurements for any one range
query, the aggregated side-channel measurements will result
in a peak corresponding to the approximate volume. Since
there are at most 78 different range queries for N = 12 we de-
cided to gather around 10,000 traces to be able to see a peak
for each approximate volume. We gathered 10,000 traces
from 10,000 uniformly chosen range queries for Experiments
I and III. We processed all those traces to obtain the approx-
imate/noisy volumes. In Experiment II, we gathered up to
15,000 traces so we would have enough observations for the
queries which are made fewer times. On average, gathering
10,000 traces takes around 8 hours and processing them takes
another 3 hours. The experiments and the code to run the
Clique-finding algorithm, Match & Extend and noise reduc-
tion step can be found here [2].
After processing the measurements, we obtained a set of
approximate volumes, on which we then ran noisy clique-
finding and Match & Extend, which in turn output recon-
structed databases. Figure 5 illustrates the quality of the re-
covered values for the noisy clique-finding and Match & Ex-
tend algorithms. The noisy clique-finding algorithm is run
with several values for the noise budget while the Match &
Extend is run with a fixed noise budget of 0.002. For each of
the N values 1,2, . . . ,N, we expect to recover a candidate vol-
ume, corresponding to the number of records in the database
that take that value. For a database with range of size N, we
define the success rate as the number of candidate volumes
recovered divided by N. For example in our experiments if
we recover only 11 candidate volumes for a database of range
size N = 12, then we have a success rate of 11/12. We define
the error rate of a recovered volume as its percentage of devi-
ation from the original volume that it corresponds to. We look
at the recovered database and compare it to the original one.
For each candidate volume v′ that is recovered, we compare
it to the corresponding value in the real database, v and report
the error rate as |v′− v|/v. So for example, if the algorithm
only recovered 11 values for a database of size 12, we will
report the percentage error for the 11 recovered values.
Figure 5 shows both the success rate and the error percent-
age for all experiments. For success rate (orange line), it can
be seen that for the noisy clique-finding algorithm, increasing
the noise budget helps to recover more volumes in all three ex-
periments. The Match & Extend algorithm, used with a fixed
noise budget of 0.002 could recover all the volumes in all
three experiments. For error percentage the average percent-
age of error is marked with a blue dot. The 90% confidence
Table 1: Performance Comparison of Noisy Clique with Noise
Budget 0.006 vs. Match & Extend Algorithm, with 99% Con-
fidence interval
Noisy Clique
(0.006) Match & Extend
Error Percentage 0.11 % - 0.22 % 0.08 % - 0.11 %
Run Time (s) 0 - 3250 61 - 163
interval is marked with the black marker. The confidence in-
terval indicates that for a new set of experiments with the
same setting, we are 90% confident that the average error rate
will fall within that interval. For the noisy clique-finding al-
gorithm, increasing the noise budget causes the average error
percentage to increase and the confidence interval to grow. In
some cases with noise budget 0.005 and 0.006, some of the re-
covered databases in Experiment I were very far off from the
actual databases, causing the error interval in these settings
to be much larger than in other settings. In Experiments II,
however, we did not observe volumes which were completely
off for noise budget 0.005 and 0.006 but as it can be seen the
success rate did not reach 100%. So the noisy clique-finding
algorithm completely failed for some instances. In a nutshell,
although it seems that increasing the noise budget helped to
achieve higher success rates, since the error percentage grows,
the quality of the recovered databases is lower. For the Match
& Extend algorithm the average amount of error and the width
of error interval is comparable to the noisy clique-finding al-
gorithm with small noise budget but the success rate is much
higher.
Figure 6 shows the average run time as well as 90% confi-
dence interval of the successful database recovery in seconds.
It can be seen that the average run time of noisy clique grows
with the size of the noise budget. The Match & Extend algo-
rithm, however, always uses noise budget of 0.002 and so its
average running time remains low.
Table 1 compares the performance of the Match & Ex-
tend algorithm and the noisy clique algorithm on successful
instances (meaning, the performance of the noisy-clique is
taken only over the instances for which the recovered database
had the correct size N). The noisy clique-finding algorithm
with noise budget 0.006 performs better in terms of success
rate than noisy clique-finding with smaller noise budgets, and
we select it as a comparable algorithm to Match & Extend al-
gorithm. We are 99% certain that in a new set of experiments
with the same setting as presented here, the Match & Extend
algorithm would output a result in at most 163 seconds with
at most 0.11% error. The noisy clique finding algorithm, on
the other hand, would output a result in at most 3250 seconds
with at most 0.22% error.
Table 2 and Table 3 compare the clique and Match & Ex-
tend algorithms and the improvement achieved by the error
reduction step using the CVP solver. Recall that the error
percentage is computed for each recovered coordinate. We
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(a) Success Rate and error percentage
for Experiment I
(b) Success rate and error percentage
for Experiment II
(c) Success rate and error percentage
for Experiment III
Figure 5: Comparison of the Success rate and Error Percentage for the noisy clique algorithm and Match & Extend algorithm.
The noisy clique algorithm is run using noise budget in the range 0.001−0.006 and Match & Extend is run with noise budget
0.002. The orange line is the success rate (higher is better). The blue dot is the average error percentage and the black line
segment is the 90% confidence interval (lower dot and narrower interval is better).
Figure 6: Average running time of Noisy Clique for different
Noise Budget vs. Match & Extend Algorithm with Noise
Budget of 0.002. The black line shows the 90% confidence
interval.
measured the quality of the recovered databases in two ways:
in Table 2 we report the average value of the error percentage
over all the volumes in all recovered databases. For Table 3,
we compute for each database the largest error percentage of
its coordinates, and we report the average of all these maxima
over all databases in Experiments I, II and III.
It can be seen that for Match & Extend algorithm the av-
erage error percentage is reduced from 0.09 to 0.07, from
0.10 to 0.09 and from 0.09 to 0.08 in Experiments I, II and
III, respectively. Table 3 shows similar results for maximum
error percentage. Namely for Match & Extend algorithm the
maximum error percentage is reduced from 0.22 to 0.20, from
0.30 to 0.21 and from 0.30 to 0.22 in Experiments I, II and
III, respectively. 5 Hence we observed that the combination
of Match & Extend algorithm with error reduction step has
the maximum error percentage of 0.22% on average.
5Table 2 and Table 3 present the L1 norm and L∞ norm, respectively. The
CVP solver optimizes for L2 norm, so it has a larger effect on decreasing
L∞ norm than L1 norm. In case the objective is to minimize the L1 norm, an
integer programming approach would be preferable.
Table 2: Average Error Percentage
Noisy Clique Match & Extend
Database No CVP CVP No CVP CVP
Real Database 0.21% 0.19% 0.09% 0.07%
Non-uniform Query 0.13% 0.10% 0.10% 0.09%
Gaussian Database 0.16% 0.10% 0.09% 0.08%
Table 3: Maximum Error Percentage
Noisy Clique Match & Extend
Database No CVP CVP No CVP CVP
Real Database 0.86% 0.86% 0.22% 0.20%
Non-uniform Query 0.37% 0.27% 0.30% 0.21%
Gaussian Database 0.55% 0.38% 0.30% 0.22%
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we launched a cache side-channel attack against
the SQLite database management system. We developed
two algorithms that approximately recover the database us-
ing the information leaked from the side-channel attack. Fi-
nally, we showed the effectiveness of closest vector problem
(CVP) solvers in reducing the overall noise in the recovered
databases to obtain databases with improved accuracy. We
showed that for attributes with range of size 12 our algorithm
can recover the approximate database in at most 163 seconds
with maximum error percentage of 0.22% on average.
As a possible approach to mitigate the attacks presented
in this work, we suggest that when processing a range query,
a random number of dummy elements get appended to the
results and returned in addition to the true matches. The effect
of such a countermeasure is twofold. (1) It makes it difficult
for the side-channel attacker to able to aggregate information
over different runs to obtain good approximations of the vol-
umes. (2) It makes the graph generation and clique-finding
algorithms more expensive, as there will be a large number
of additional nodes and edges in the graph (recall that each
13
observed volume corresponds to a node in the graph). Since
clique-finding is NP-hard, adding even a small fraction of
nodes to the graph can make the attack infeasible.
In future work, it would be interesting to explore the per-
formance of the Prime & Probe [26] which is a more generic
type of cache side-channel attack that can be used even in
scenarios where the victim and attacker do not have a shared
library. Further, as mentioned previously, improved attacks on
encrypted databases are possible when the full access pattern
is revealed (cf. Grubbs et al. [16]). It will be interesting to
explore whether partial information about the access pattern
can be obtained via the cache side-channel and whether this
information can be used to obtain improved attacks.
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